

31 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Wattles

Bob:

The attached is either a copy of or very similar to a paper which Hugh Cunningham served up to the Director and others shortly before he became the Director of Training. As far as I know, no one poured cold water on these ideas, although they did seem a little ambitious and could only come about over a considerable period of time. Hugh was asked to take over the Office of Training, look at its programs, and then submit his recommendations as to what changes should be made.

I know of no reasons why some or all of these things shouldn't come forward. As you and he know, the disposition of these ideas would probably be to discuss them first with the Deputy Directors and then with the Director. I am sure that there will not be unanimity of opinion, and this of course dictates the careful selection and staffing of those proposals which are recommended. Without committing myself to just what should be done or at what pace, I am inclined to agree that it is time to broaden and deepen OTR's function.

L. K. White

25X1

Attachment

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*Hing. Cassin, [unclear]*

(About November 1968)

A Proposal for the Office of Training

A. The need

1. For many years OTR has been a good tradecraft college.
2. Now it is time to broaden and deepen its function:

Without neglecting the how of intelligence, start concentrating on the what and the why.

3. Reason: American interests in the outside world are undergoing rapid and profound change. This change is likely to accelerate over the next ten years.

That means that American foreign policy is also in for profound change.

And that means that Intelligence will also change, to a greater degree than we are yet prepared to cope with.

4. We should now add to OTR some of the functions of a graduate school -

With some of the overtones of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.

And some of the product of those think-tanks like Stanford Research Institute and the Institute for Defense Analyses - though with greater relevance and vastly less expense than characterize such outside outfits.

- a. A place to study the functions of intelligence.

- 1) Especially the connections between collection and production, between human and technical resources, between minimum essential requirements and the nice-to-know.
- 2) Methods of evaluation for accuracy, relevance to policy needs, validation of past judgments and approaches. (A serious analytical history of military estimates on the Soviet Union would be salutary. So would a validation study of the JIIRG Report, some three years after its adoption in 1966.)
- 3) Methods of analysis - e.g., the tyranny of dubious statistics over intelligence judgments and the validity of feeding these judgments into Pentagon computers for planning purposes. (One crying need is for a hard look at the institutionalized delusions of the National Intelligence

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Projections for Planning. Everyone knows they are phony, but when all the axes have been ground into impressive tabulations they are treated like confirmations strong as Holy Writ.)

- b. A place to assign long-range substantive problems. E.g. -
- 1) World-wide problems which will have important long-range effects on both US interests and the role of US Intelligence in helping understand those effects - especially the problems of population and food, world trade, monetary systems.
  - 2) Some typical examples from Latin America:
    - a) The political and social role of the military establishments.
    - b) The political and social role of the Catholic Church.
    - c) The political and social role of the oligarchies.
    - d) The long-range economic outlook.
    - e) The effect of rising anti-US nationalism.
  - 3) Similar subjects from other parts of the world, especially the backward parts. For example, why did every Indonesian expert in the US Government assume in September 1965 the total absence of any internal force capable of preventing a Communist takeover of Indonesia?
- c. A place to keep track of research projects of general interest, both to attract a maximum of useful contributions and to avoid duplication. Perhaps the academic custom of occasionally issuing a list of works in progress would be useful.
- d. A place to support the researches of NIPE into community problems - e.g., the  Report on the Middle East and the  Report on Early Warning. 25X1
- e. A place to develop connections with the scholarly world, with the aim of winning eventual quasi-public awareness of the conscientiousness and accuracy of intelligence research. (And incidentally of educating the public to get over the notion that intelligence equals espionage and covert action and no more.)

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B. The method

1. Upgrade OTR into an Institute of Intelligence, on a recognizable par with the Foreign Service Institute.
2. Create a Division of Studies.
  - a. Not permanently staffed by all the experts necessary to do the types of long-range research suggested above, but so organized as to:
    - 1) Stimulate, facilitate, and keep track of such research as it may be carried out all over the outfit.
    - 2) Provide a temporary haven where experienced senior officers can profitably spend a few weeks or months (e.g. between assignments) studying some specific problem, uninterrupted by current managerial responsibilities, meetings, and telephones. Not a disposal device or a WPA leaf-raking project, it could be useful only if it were seen as a serious opportunity by the directorates. Subjects for study might emerge from discussion of some problem at the DCI's morning meeting, or be proposed by others. For example, a senior African expert might study all our Estimates on Black Africa and contribute to answering the question whether we are estimating on the right subjects with the right emphasis.
    - 3) Bring experts on a given problem together from time to time in order a) to assure that the Agency's great assets in these fields are most usefully marshaled, and b) to help break down the lingering tribalism that still keeps the Agency's tribes unnecessarily isolated from one another. (At present the two principal devices serving this purpose are the Mid-Career Course in OTR and the rather brief in-house discussions of early drafts of Estimates. More cross-fertilization is needed.)
    - 4) Specifically, conduct "graduate seminars" of people carefully selected from all over the Agency, to meet for two or three days  on a specific program of related topics all having to do with, say, the US interest in Cuba, or the Soviet interest in the subcontinent of Asia, or the long-range utility of Comint or computers.
    - 5) Set a high standard for scholarly discipline in depth and accuracy of research, and in strength and clarity of presentation.

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- 25X1
- 6) Facilitate the publication of worthy products of this research. For some time to come this would mean publication within the intelligence community, but we ought also to prepare for the day when it will be politically possible to allow Agency scholars to publish outside the community such worthy works as [ ] recent long study of anti-US nationalism in Latin America. Until that day comes we ought to give such studies far more accurate editing and more respectable physical production than they sometimes receive nowadays. Such publication would be a reward for work well done; it could be made into an attractive incentive for doing work of real and fairly lasting value, and gradually lessen our present practice of publishing some ephemera for morale purposes.
  - 7) Specifically, make better use of Studies in Intelligence for identifying appropriate subjects and publishing results as far as possible.
  - 8) Look for ways of involving some of the Career Trainees in such a program, perhaps as temporary research assistants to old hands involved in research projects. Objectives:
    - a) A kind of on-the-job training.
    - b) A way of interesting the Career Trainees in the long-range problems of intelligence.
    - c) Identifying any special aptitudes they have, and giving them an earlier sense of participation in the intelligence process than they can get from classroom training alone.
  3. In short, provide a vehicle to the DCI and the directorates for carrying out those kinds of research into the current and prospective problems of functions, methods, and substance which they themselves identify as needing attention. Nothing proposed here would be intended to diminish either the jurisdiction or the responsibilities of management as presently constituted. The proposal looks rather toward the development of a center for scholarship which each senior manager could use as he saw fit and to the degree he was willing to support its serious objectives.

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